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INTRODUCTION
Under the patent and copyright laws, the owner of a patent for an
invention or of a copyright for a work has the right to sell, license, or
transfer; to exploit it individually and exclusively; or even to withhold
it from the public.1 By contrast, under the antitrust laws, a unilateral
refusal to deal may constitute an element of a violation of § 2 of the
Sherman Act, and the courts may then impose a duty on the violator
to deal with others, including possibly with its actual or would-be
competitors. 2
The central question addressed by this Article arises from an at-
tempt to harmonize these potentially conflicting principles: Under
what circumstances should the antitrust laws impose a duty to deal on
the owner of intellectual property? Two important court of appeals
decisions have taken notably different approaches to this question. In
Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak (Image Technical),3
the Ninth Circuit held that in the absence of legitimate business justifi-
cations, the owner of copyright and patent rights violated the Sherman
Act by its refusal to sell or license to its competitors the products sub-
ject to intellectual property protection. A few years later, in In re In-
dependent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation (Xerox), 4 the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit expressly disagreed with the
Ninth Circuit and rejected the proposition that even in the absence of
legitimate justifications, the antitrust laws might impose a duty on the
owner of patents or copyrights to deal with competitors.
On several occasions, albeit not in the context of intellectual prop-
erty, the Supreme Court has recognized that the antitrust laws may
impose a duty on a firm with market power to deal with its competi-
tors.5 Last term, however, the Supreme Court limited the reach of
some of those prior decisions in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. (Trinko).6
This Article will explore this apparent-but in fact exaggerated-
tension between the intellectual property regime and the antitrust
laws. What are the policy justifications for imposing, or refusing to
impose, a duty on the owner of intellectual property to deal with com-
1. See infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); Aspen
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
3. 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1094 (1998).
4. 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1143 (2001).
5. See supra note 2.
6. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
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petitors? Why do I conclude that Image Technical was correctly de-
cided? Why does Image Technical remain sound doctrine after Xerox,
Trinko, and a handful of other recent cases?
I begin in Part II by analyzing the Image Technical and Xerox deci-
sions. In Part III, I review other court of appeals decisions that have
examined these issues. Part IV then identifies the policies underlying
the antitrust and intellectual property regimes, followed in Part V by a
discussion of the statutes and case law governing these two regimes
that speak generally to the question of the duty by the owner of intel-
lectual property, and of other kinds of property, to deal with competi-
tors. In Part VI, I offer a harmonization of the supposedly conflicting
policies of these two regimes, which is based on the principle that pat-
ents and copyrights offer defined rights, with defined limits, to their
owners. I therefore conclude that attempts to extend the "monopoly"
conferred by the patent or copyright, by seeking to exercise rights be-
yond the statutory scope of the copyright or patent, are unlawful. This
analysis supports my contention that the result reached by the Ninth
Circuit in Image Technical is sound as a matter both of law and of
policy.
II. IMAGE TECHNICAL AND XEROX
The Image Technical decision was the Ninth Circuit's reconsidera-
tion, after remand from the Supreme Court, of challenges by indepen-
dent service organizations (ISOs) to restrictive sales policies adopted
by Eastman Kodak, a manufacturer of photocopiers and micrographic
reproduction equipment.7 The plaintiffs, in competition with Kodak's
service branch, offered repair service to the purchasers of defendant's
machines. In most situations, those repairs required the replacement
of parts that were available only from Kodak or from the third party
manufacturers of those parts.8 For several years, Kodak had sold re-
placement parts to the ISOs; after an increase in competition from
ISOs in the service market, however, Kodak changed its policy, declin-
7. The district court had originally granted the defendant-Kodak's motion for summary judg-
ment. Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,402
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 1988). This judgment was reversed by the Ninth Circuit. Image Technical
Serv. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court affirmed the
denial of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). The case was then tried before a jury, resulting in a
substantial verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs. See Image Technical 125 F.3d at 1201.
8. Some, but not all, of these parts were subject to patent protection. See infra note 14 and
accompanying text. "[AIII Kodak diagnostic software and service software [was] copyrighted."
Image Technical, 125 F.3d at 1214.
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ing to sell to the ISOs and securing agreements from the third-party
manufacturers that they also would not sell parts to ISOs.
On appeal from the judgment awarding the ISOs both monetary
and injunctive relief, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's con-
clusion that Kodak's refusals to deal constituted an element of the
offenses of monopolization and attempting to monopolize, in violation
of § 2 of the Sherman Act. The district court entered a ten-year per-
manent injunction requiring Kodak to sell all parts to all ISOs at rea-
sonable prices.9 Although the court of appeals modified the terms of
the injunction,10 the court definitively rejected Kodak's "maximalist"
argument-that the entry of such an injunction was inconsistent with
the absolute right of a copyright or patent owner to decide to whom to
sell, or not to sell, its intellectual property.
The Ninth Circuit recognized the opposing tugs of intellectual prop-
erty and antitrust law, which I referred to at the outset of this Article.
But the court of appeals rejected the defendant's contention that the
ownership of those patents and copyrights alone sufficed to overcome
the plaintiffs' assertion that Kodak's refusal to sell to ISOs constituted
unlawful exclusionary conduct. The court accepted "Kodak's conten-
tion that its refusal to sell its parts to ISOs ... based on its reluctance
to sell its patented or copyrighted parts was a presumptively legitimate
business justification."" In the key portion of the opinion addressing
the issue raised by this Article, however, the court held that this pre-
sumption was rebuttable-either for the not terribly remarkable rea-
son that "the monopolist acquired the protection of the intellectual
property laws in an unlawful manner,"'12 or for the potentially far
more significant reason, that the asserted business justification "does
not legitimately promote competition or that the justification is
pretextual."13
Here, the Ninth Circuit found substantial evidence that Kodak's
proffered concern of protecting its intellectual property interests as
the reason for its refusal to sell parts to the ISOs was indeed pretex-
tual. Kodak had previously sold parts to ISOs, thus indicating its own
9. See Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1996-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,624
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1996) (post-judgment memorandum on motion for permanent injunction).
10. The court ordered the deletion of provisions respecting the reasonableness of Kodak's
prices, ordering instead that the prices be nondiscriminatory. Image Technical, 125 F.3d at
1224-28.
11. Id. at 1219 (emphasis added). The court noted that this "presumption should act to focus
the factfinder on the primary interest of both intellectual property and antitrust laws: public
interest." Id. at 1218.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1212 (emphasis added).
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assessment that such a practice was profitable; it adopted the chal-
lenged policy only after one ISO won a contract with the State of Cali-
fornia. Kodak also continued to sell parts to customers who serviced
their own machines. And its refusal to sell to the ISOs applied not
only to the sixty-five replacement parts covered by patents, but also to
the thousands of other parts that were not patented. 14
The court's alternative formulation-that the presumption that a
defendant's refusal to deal was legitimate could be rebutted by a
showing that the justification did not "legitimately promote competi-
tion"' 5-is potentially far more expansive. The basis for rebutting the
presumption would involve courts in the daunting role of weighing, in
individual cases, the procompetitive goals of the antitrust laws against
the mixed goals of intellectual property regimes, which include the
grant of a federally protected monopoly of finite duration as the in-
centive and reward for inventiveness and creativity. 16 But the court of
appeals did not weigh this concern as an independent ground for over-
riding the presumption. Instead, it conflated these two bases by ob-
serving that "[n]either the aims of intellectual property law, nor the
antitrust laws justify allowing a monopolist to rely upon a pretextual
business justification to mask anticompetitive conduct. 1 7 Nonethe-
less, the court's examination of the pretextual nature of Kodak's ex-
planation for its conduct is helpful in another way-it supports the
conclusion that the refusal to deal had serious anticompetitive effects
(by shutting the ISOs out of the service market) without any offsetting
efficiencies or potential benefits to consumers.18
In contrast, three years later in In re Independent Service Organiza-
tions Antitrust Litigation v. Xerox Corp.,19 the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit erected far higher hurdles for an antitrust plaintiff
challenging a patent or copyright owner's refusal to deal. The facts
were similar to those in Image Technical. The defendant, Xerox, was
the manufacturer of high volume copiers, and over time, it had imple-
mented a policy of refusing to sell replacement parts to ISOs that
competed with it for the servicing of its machines. Xerox also refused
14. Id. at 1219. Another indication, although not referred to by the Ninth Circuit, that this
asserted justification was pretextual is that the defense was not raised in earlier stages of the
litigation, including before the Supreme Court.
15. Image Technical, 125 F.3d at 1212.
16. As this Article demonstrates, this "monopoly" does not confer immunity from scrutiny
under the antitrust laws of the use of that intellectual property.
17. Image Technical, 125 F.3d at 1219.
18. See generally Marina Lao, Reclaiming a Role for Intent Evidence in Monopolization Anal-
ysis, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 151 (2004).
19. 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (patent claim); id. at 1329 (copyright claim).
2006] 1215
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to sell copyrighted manuals for its copiers or to license copyrighted
software to the ISOs. Explicitly declining to follow the Ninth Circuit's
approach in Image Technical, the Federal Circuit held 20 that the abso-
lute right of the owner of patented or copyrighted products to refuse
to sell to others could be overcome only if the patent or copyright had
been obtained by illegal means,21 or, with respect to copyrighted
materials, if the copyrights "were used to gain monopoly power be-
yond the statutory copyright granted by Congress. '22 The Xerox court
expressly rejected any judicial inquiry into the defendant's "subjective
motivation," such as the pretextual reasons offered by Kodak in Image
Technical, even if the defendant's refusal to deal resulted in injury to
competition.23
These two decisions obviously reflect different approaches to recon-
ciling the apparently different values embodied in the antitrust and
intellectual property regimes. 24 The Federal Circuit's conclusion in
20. Because this case involved an appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Kansas, the
court of appeals analyzed the balancing of the patent and antitrust laws under Federal Circuit law
but analyzed the balancing of the copyright and antitrust laws under precedents of the Tenth
Circuit. Id. at 1325.
The patent claims, which allegedly gave the Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction, were in fact
contained in defendant-Xerox's counterclaim to the Sherman Act claims brought by the ISOs.
Subsequently, in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826
(2002), the Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction over patent
claims does not extend to such counterclaims because such an action does not "arise under" the
Patent Act. Therefore, today the Xerox case would have been heard by the Tenth Circuit, which
presumably would have applied its own precedent to all issues.
21. The court recognized that the patent owner's right to refuse to deal would be overcome if
the patent was obtained through a knowing and willful fraud on the Patent Office or if the patent
infringement suit was a "mere sham" under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Neither of these two
exceptions was implicated here. Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1326.
22. Id. at 1329. It is unclear just what possibilities are open to an antitrust plaintiff under this
cryptic reference. Is this a hint about copyright misuse? See infra notes 111-117 and accompa-
nying text.
As noted previously, the Federal Circuit followed Tenth Circuit law for the copyright analysis,
see supra note 20, concluding that the Tenth Circuit would have followed the First Circuit's
decision in Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994).
Data General is discussed infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
23. The court continued: "We therefore will not inquire into [the patent owner's] subjective
motivation for exerting his statutory rights, even though his refusal to sell or license his patented
invention may have an anticompetitive effect, so long as that anticompetitive effect is not ille-
gally extended beyond the statutory patent grant." Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1327-28.
24. In response to the Court's invitation, see CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 531 U.S. 922 (2000),
the Solicitor General submitted a brief recommending a denial of certiorari in Xerox, suggesting
that it was not an "appropriate vehicle for the resolution of the difficult questions implicated by
the intersection of antitrust law and intellectual property law." Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 7, CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 531 U.S. 1143 (No. 00-62), 2001 WL 34135314.
The United States argued that the Ninth Circuit's and Federal Circuit's decisions contained pro-
cedural obstacles and "significant ambiguities," respectively, resulting in a lack of clarity as to
the scope of their holdings, and that therefore these two decisions were not necessarily inconsis-
1216
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Xerox is not the product of an express elevation of intellectual prop-
erty law over antitrust. As a practical matter, however, it reaches pre-
cisely that result by viewing the rights of the patent or copyright
owner far more expansively and in more absolute terms than is called
for under either the policies underlying the intellectual property re-
gime or the statutes and interpretive case law.25
In fact, the antitrust, patent, and copyright regimes should be
viewed as complementary systems for achieving a common goal-the
maximization of consumer welfare-albeit by following different
paths.26 I conclude, therefore, that the Ninth Circuit's approach is the
correct outcome.27 After a review of the discussion of this issue in
tent. Id. The brief also suggested that the law in this area required further development before
Supreme Court review would be appropriate. Id. at 16; see also CSU, 531 U.S. at 1143 (denying
certiorari).
One author has written:
The tension between the Ninth Circuit's Kodak decision and the Federal Circuit's
Xerox decision will need to be resolved in a case that presents a clear test of when
antitrust issues can be considered in the presence of patents. Absent such a resolve or a
consensus, both primary and developmental innovations are likely to be deterred by
the existing uncertainty in the courts.
James Langenfeld, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Steps Toward Striking a Balance, 52 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 91, 110 (2001).
25. See Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761,
764 (2002) ("To state that action within the scope of the patent should automatically be immune
from antitrust scrutiny (so the incentives underlying the patent system are not diminished)
'solves' the patent-antitrust conflict only by according priority to the patent laws."); id. at 778
("In short, the Xerox approach prevents antitrust from playing any legitimate role in the attempt
to increase welfare.") (internal citation omitted).
26. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
("[T]he aims and objectives of patent and antitrust laws may seem, at first glance, wholly at odds.
However, the two bodies of law are actually complementary, as both are aimed at encouraging
innovation, industry and competition."); E. Thomas Sullivan, The Confluence of Antitrust and
Intellectual Property at the New Century, 1 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 2 (2000) ("Although
tensions exist between antitrust and intellectual property, the two legal regimes are complemen-
tary."). See also HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST § 13.3d4, at 13-31 (2002 &
Supp. 2004) (attempting to reconcile the approaches of Image Technical, Xerox, and Data Gen-
eral, and suggesting that Xerox's "irrebuttable presumption may be appropriate ... but only
within narrow confines").
27. Previous commentators who have criticized the Federal Circuit's near-absolute rejection
of a duty to deal by the owner of intellectual property include James B. Gambrell, The Evolving
Interplay of Patent Rights and Antitrust Restraints in the Federal Circuit, 9 TEx. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 137, 156 (2000) (stating that the Federal Circuit "elevates patent rights at the expense of
unfair competition and core antitrust principles that it was not given jurisdiction to control");
Simon Genevaz, Against Immunity for Unilateral Refusals to Deal in Intellectual Property: Why
Antitrust Law Should Not Distinguish Between IP and Other Property Rights, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 741 (2004) (arguing against different antitrust treatment for intellectual property, and
suggesting rule of reason analysis of all unilateral refusals to deal); A. Douglas Melamed & Ali
M. Stoeppelwerth, The CSU Case: Facts, Formalism and the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellec-
tual Property Law, 10 GEo. MASON L. REV. 407, 407 (2002) (characterizing CSU as "wrong as a
matter of both law and policy"); Nicholas Oettinger, In re Independent Service Organizations
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some other appellate decisions, I explain why the balance drawn in
Image Technical between these two bodies of law is in fact fully con-
sistent with the policies they embody and the goals they seek to
achieve. 28
Antitrust Litigation, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 323, 323 (2001) (Xerox's "broad protection for
intellectual property rights will likely harm competition"); Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the
New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 68 ANTITRUST L.J.
913, 919-23 (2001); id. at 920 (criticizing Xerox, which contains "sweeping language that exalts
patent and copyright rights over other considerations"); Suzzette Rodriguez Hurley, Note, Fail-
ing to Balance Patent Rights and Antitrust Concerns: The Federal Circuit's Holding in In re Inde-
pendent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation, 13 FED. CIR. B.J. 475 (2004); see also
Seungwoo Son, Selective Refusals to Sell Patented Goods: The Relationship Between Patent Rights
and Antitrust Law, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 109, 190-91 (2002). Son stated:
[I]f a patent holder's refusal to deal derived from a conditional or selective licensing
practice, and the patentee (1) has market power, (2) excludes or substantially impairs
the competitive capacity of a competitor or brings about anti-competitive effects in a
related market, or (3) constrains customer choices directly or indirectly, then, unless it
proffers a valid reason to justify its refusal, the conduct as a category of patent misuse
should be condemned under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
Id. at 191.
See also Aaron B. Rabinowitz, When Does a Patent Right Become an Antitrust Wrong? Antitrust
Liability for Refusals to Deal in Patented Goods, 11 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2, 28 (2005), available at
http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/vlli2/article7.pdf ("[A]dopting the Xerox rule would have greater
negative consequences for the nation's consumers than would adopting the Ninth Circuit's rule
in Kodak 1.").
28. Not surprisingly, a number of commentators take the opposite view, criticizing the Ninth
Circuit's approach in Image Technical. See, e.g., James C. Burling et al., The Antitrust Duty to
Deal and Intellectual Property Rights, 24 J. CORP. L. 527, 541 (1999) (Image Technical's "analysis
was grossly misguided"); Daniel J. Gifford, The Antitrust/Intellectual Property Interface: An
Emerging Solution to an Intractable Problem, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 363, 409 (2002) ("The Federal
Circuit's approach appears administratively superior to that of the Ninth Circuit because it car-
ries a greater potential for consistent application."); R. Hewitt Pate, Refusals to Deal and Intel-
lectual Property Rights, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 429, 431, 438-41 (2002); Sharon Brawner
McCullen, Comment; The Federal Circuit and Ninth Circuit Face-Off. Does A Patent Holder
Violate the Sherman Act by Unilaterally Excluding Others From a Patented Invention in More
Than One Relevant Market?, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 469 (2001). See also Peter M. Boyle et al., Anti-
trust Law at the Federal Circuit: Red Light or Green Light at the IP-Antitrust Intersection?, 69
ANTITRUST L.J. 739, 747 (2002) ("Xerox got it right, at least with respect to its ultimate holding
on liability. .. . [But the decision is] marred by murky reasoning and thin support on critical
points .... "); Michelle M. Burtis & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Why an Original Can Be Better Than a
Copy: Intellectual Property, The Antitrust Refusal to Deal, and ISO Antitrust Litigation, 9 Sup.
CT. ECON. REV. 143, 145 (2001) (suggesting that the Image Technical and Xerox decisions "can
coexist legally and as a matter of economics," but that Xerox "efficiently balances the intellec-
tual property and antitrust laws").
Professors Lopatka and Page criticize both decisions. See John E. Lopatka & William H.
Page, Monopolization, Innovation, and Consumer Welfare, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 367, 395-96
(2001) ("The result in ISO avoids the troublesome inquiry into motivation proposed by the
Ninth Circuit in Kodak, but raises questions of its own .... [ISO] attempt[ed], admirably but
disingenuously, to limit the damaging reach of Kodak."). Cf Benjamin Klein & John Shepard
Wiley, Jr., Competitive Price Discrimination as an Antitrust Justification for Intellectual Property
Refusals to Deal, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 599 (2003) (declining to discuss whether the presence of
intellectual property rights should be a sufficient defense to a refusal to deal, but arguing that the
1218
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III. ANALYSIS BY OTHER COURTS OF APPEALS
While Image Technical and Xerox are the leading decisions examin-
ing the duty of the owner of intellectual property to license or sell its
patented or copyrighted product to others, they are not the only cases
to have considered this question. Rather, the first important judicial
discussion of this question-although a case that at the end of the day
is remarkable for its confusing and inconclusive analysis-is the First
Circuit's opinion in Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support
Corp.29
In that case, the plaintiff, Data General (DG), manufactured and
sold computers and also developed ADEX, a proprietary computer
program for diagnosing problems in its computers. Although DG had
initially sold replacement parts for its computers to "third party main-
tainers" (TPMs), and also had sold or licensed its diagnostic software
to TPMs, it subsequently altered that policy. DG eventually decided
to sell those parts only directly to its customers or to other sources,
but not to TPMs, and it refused to license ADEX either to its own
customers or to customers of TPMs.
DG filed an action against Grumman, a TPM (and thus a competi-
tor of the plaintiff in the market to service DG's computers), alleging
that the defendant had engaged in copyright infringement and misap-
propriation of trade secrets with respect to ADEX. The defendant
asserted that DG's refusal to grant a license for ADEX to Grumman
violated the antitrust laws. Rejecting that defense, the court of ap-
peals stated:
[W]e hold that while exclusionary conduct can include a monopo-
list's unilateral refusal to license a copyright, an author's desire to
exclude others from use of its copyrighted work is a presumptively
valid business justification for any immediate harm to consumers.
... Wary of undermining the Sherman Act, however, we do not
hold that an antitrust plaintiff can never rebut this presumption, for
there may be rare cases in which imposing antitrust liability is un-
likely to frustrate the objectives of the Copyright Act.30
Unlike Image Technical, however, the First Circuit's opinion never
provided the critical missing elements: Just what were those "rare
cases" that would suffice to overcome this presumption, and what
kind of evidence would be required of the plaintiff?
defendants' practices in Image Technical and Xerox are best understood as attempts at
aftermarket metering price discrimination-legitimate business justifications with a limited like-
lihood of producing anticompetitive effects).
29. Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994).
30. Id. at 1187 & n.64 (emphasis added).
20061 1219
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
The court of appeals noted that there was no evidence before it of
what would be the obvious exception recognized in both Image Tech-
nical and Xerox-unlawful conduct by DG in the acquisition of the
copyright. The court also hinted that an Aspen Skiing situation3 1-
prior dealings between the copyright owner and its competitors, which
the owner then terminated-might also overcome the presumption.
But it then proceeded to distinguish Aspen Skiing based on the differ-
ences in the defendants' motivations for termination and the different
competitive effects of these two decisions. Finally, the court made
cryptic reference to evidence that DG knew that the development of
improved diagnostic software such as ADEX would help maintain its
monopoly position in the aftermarket for service of DG computers,
perhaps suggesting that in some situations this knowledge or intent
might be another basis for overcoming the presumption. But, the
court then noted that here this improved software enhanced the qual-
ity of DG's repair services and thus benefited its customers. 32
A few months prior to the Xerox decision, in Intergraph Corp. v.
Intel Corp.,33 a different panel of the Federal Circuit rejected a claim
that a refusal by a manufacturer of patented microprocessors to pro-
vide chip samples, technical assistance, and other special customer
benefits was unlawful monopolization, under an "essential facilities"
theory,34 on the ground that the plaintiff and defendant were not com-
petitors. The court also rejected the plaintiff's generalized refusal to
deal claim, regardless of whether the criteria for showing an essential
facility were met, finding that the plaintiff's initiation of a patent in-
fringement action against the defendant constituted a legitimate busi-
ness justification for the defendant to refuse to continue doing
31. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). See infra notes
59-60, 130-133 and accompanying text.
32. Data General, 36 F.3d at 1187-89.
The court's opinion also contained a brief discussion of DG's other restrictive policies-its
refusal to provide spare parts, certain documentation, schematics, and a variety of other prod-
ucts and services to the TPMs. The court's reasons for finding that this conduct was not exclu-
sionary were twofold: First, these goods and services were still available directly to DG's
customers, and second, there was no evidence of harm to competition, i.e., that the customers-
as opposed to the TPMs-were injured. Id. at 1189.
See also SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 & n.10 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that
"where a patent has been lawfully acquired, subsequent conduct permissible under the patent
laws cannot trigger any liability under the antitrust laws," but expressly "leav[ing] for an appro-
priate case the resolution of the question whether damage liability can accrue to a holder for
refusing to license patents that he subsequently abuses through pooling or otherwise"), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982).
33. 195 F.3d 1346, 1356-58 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
34. See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
1220 [Vol. 55:1211
IMAGE TECHNICAL AND XEROX
business with the plaintiff.35 Interestingly, the opinion contains no
suggestion that the defendant's refusal to deal might be justified be-
cause the material withheld was the subject of intellectual property
protection.
The reconciliation of the Image Technical and Xerox decisions was
most recently attempted by the Eleventh Circuit in Telecom Technical
Services, Inc. v. Rolm Co.36 The defendant, Siemens, manufactured
private branch exchanges (PBXs), which are computers that direct
telephone calls and data transmissions though a network of private
extensions. These PBXs included patented parts and copyrighted
software. Siemens licensed its operating system software to all end
users and to its authorized distributors; it did not, however, license so-
called reconfiguration software to anyone because that kind of
software allowed Siemens to vary the scope of the licenses and to
charge variable prices based on the number of options chosen by the
customer. Although Siemens refused to sell the patented parts-
needed in most cases to service PBXs-directly to ISOs, Siemens did
sell those parts directly to the end users, and it also allowed end users
to hire an ISO to service the machine, if they furnished the ISO with a
letter of agency authorizing the agent to order the part on the cus-
tomer's behalf.
The Eleventh Circuit noted that "[s]everal circuits have directly
confronted the question of how to weigh the significance of a firm's
assertion of intellectual property rights as a justification for its refusal
to deal in the context of a § 2 Sherman Act action. '37 It also "recog-
nize[d] that this question lies at the intersection of intellectual prop-
erty law and antitrust law and presents a difficult and increasingly
important issue."' 38 Nevertheless, the court concluded that it did not
have to reach this question because the plaintiffs' claims could be re-
solved on other grounds.
Here, the defendant's refusal to deal directly with the ISOs did not
raise the same competitive concerns as in Image Technical because the
refusal did not allow Siemens to expand its monopoly into the service
market. Because Siemens's customers could purchase the patented
parts either from Siemens or from its authorized distributors and
could then ask the ISOs to install them, or alternatively, because the
letter of agency in fact allowed the ISOs to place those orders with
Siemens, customers suffered no harm from the challenged refusal to
35. Integraph, 195 F.3d at 1358-59.
36. 388 F.3d 820 (11th Cir. 2004).
37. Id. at 826 (citing Image Technical, Xerox, and Data General).
38. Id.
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deal. The court also found that the refusal to furnish software to the
ISOs did not constitute exclusionary behavior. Unlike the diagnostic
software at issue in Image Technical and Data General, which was
needed by ISOs to perform repairs, the operating system and recon-
figuration software at issue in Rolm Co. had no diagnostic or repair
function, and "[t]hus, the software [did] not give Siemens a competi-
tive advantage in the service market. '39
IV. POLICIES UNDERLYING THE ANTITRUST AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIMES
This panoply of decisions highlights the judicial inconsistency in de-
fining the scope of the duty of patent and copyright owners to deal
with their competitors. An examination of the policies underlying the
antitrust and intellectual property regimes serves as a good starting
point for explaining why I believe that the balance of interests re-
flected in the Ninth Circuit's decision in Image Technical is the sound
and appropriate basis for resolving any conflict between these two
regimes.
A. Antitrust Policies
The antitrust laws seek to preserve and promote competition; they
proscribe a variety of forms of individual or concerted behavior that
would inhibit the ultimate goal of advancing consumer welfare. It is
true that under certain circumstances, monopolies may be more effi-
cient-perhaps because the relevant market is characterized by ever-
increasing economies of scale. While in most situations a monopoly
will not be the most efficient way of delivering the widest and best
array of goods or services to consumers at low prices, it may be desira-
ble in other industries to permit a firm, which has obtained a monop-
oly position because it originally offered a more desirable or cheaper
product, to maintain that monopoly, on the theory that a rule allowing
such firms to harvest monopoly rents is necessary to give them the
incentive to invest capital and take risks.40 And, to be sure, it is often
preferable to allow several firms that otherwise might be competitors
to engage in joint ventures or other cooperative behavior. Nonethe-
less, in most situations, the preference of the antitrust laws is for vig-
orous competition-among or between a number of firms-as the
39. Id. at 828.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (explaining that one
element of a § 2 offense is the "willful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly] power as distin-
guished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen,
or historic accident").
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means of maximizing consumer welfare and yielding more and better
goods at lower prices. Therefore, with the limitations just mentioned,
§ 2 of the Sherman Act operates as a barrier against the improper
acquisition or control by a single firm of a significant fraction of any
relevant market.41 That statute accomplishes this goal by making it
unlawful either for a firm that already has monopoly power, or for a
firm whose behavior gives rise to a dangerous probability that it will
obtain monopoly power, to engage in a variety of predatory or exclu-
sionary practices, including certain refusals to deal.
B. Policies of Patent and Copyright Laws
The patent and copyright laws were enacted pursuant to authority
expressly given to Congress in Article I of the Constitution.42 As
stated in the preamble to that Clause, the purpose of the grant of a
limited monopoly to authors and inventors is "To promote the Pro-
gress of Science and the useful Arts . . . . ,43 Reward to authors and
inventors is important to stimulate this creativity. Affording protec-
tion also reflects notions of fairness, by not allowing others to free ride
by enjoying the benefit of inventions or works without making appro-
priate compensation to their creators. But these values are secondary
to the primary goals of the patent and copyright laws44-the produc-
tion of more and better intellectual property for the benefit of the
public, and the promotion of the greatest degree of public access con-
sistent with those other goals. 45
41. Section 18 of the Clayton Act is intended in part to preclude two firms from undertaking a
merger or acquisition when that transaction would result in the merged firms having monopoly
power. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
42. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
43. The Copyright Clause states in its entirety: "The Congress shall have Power ... To pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries ...." Id. § 8.
44. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) ("The primary
objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but '[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts."'); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)
("The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative
labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general
public good."). See also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764,
2794 (2005) ("[Clopyright's basic objective is creation and its revenue objectives are but a means
to that end ...") (Breyer, J., concurring); Pierre N. Leval, An Assembly of Idiots?, 34 CoNrN. L.
REV. 1049, 1052-53 (2002) ("Authors are thus intended beneficiaries of the Anglo-American
copyright concept, but they are only the secondary beneficiaries. The prime intended benefici-
ary is society-the monetary benefit to the author being the mechanism for securing the prime
benefit, the spread of knowledge to society.").
45. The principle that the right of the creator to a limited monopoly may be overridden by the
public interest in access is best illustrated by the fair use doctrine, now codified in 17 U.S.C.
2006] 1223
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One key question that Congress and the courts have wrestled with
for more than two centuries is the nature and extent of the appropri-
ate incentive needed to generate this output. There is considerable
disagreement regarding the degree of monopoly that is necessary to
obtain the optimum (as opposed to the maximum) quantity and qual-
ity of these two forms of intellectual property.46 In many situations,
though certainly not all, it is probable that a greater or longer form of
protection will produce more or better inventions and copyrighted
works. Thus, for example, one might predict that a doubling of the
present term of patent protection, from twenty years47 to forty years,
would increase firms' incentive to invest in research and development,
leading to more patentable inventions.48
But there is enormous uncertainty about the validity of these pre-
dictions. And even if they proved true, it does not follow that every
increase in the duration or scope of protection for intellectual prop-
erty will maximize consumer welfare.49 Indeed, there is substantial
evidence that affording too much protection will actually lessen incen-
tives for innovation.50 Furthermore, even if such an increase in pro-
§ 107 (2000). The doctrine allows others to make certain uses of a copyrighted work, without
obtaining permission from the copyright owner or making any payment for that use.
46. Brunell stated:
[I]f the vast economics literature on intellectual property conveys one message, it is
that the relationship between intellectual property protection and economic welfare is
unclear. Determining the appropriate reward to innovative activity in general, or on a
case-by-case basis, is a perilous exercise for which economics has few answers.
See Richard M. Brunell, Appropriability in Antitrust: How Much is Enough?, 69 ANTITRUST L.J.
1, 4 (2001).
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989) (offering an economic analysis for determining optimal nature, scope,
and duration of copyright protection).
47. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000) (fixing the term of a patent as twenty years from the date
on which the application for the patent was filed in United States).
48. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205-07 (2003) (deferring to Congressional judgment
that extension of copyright term by an additional twenty years would increase incentives to cre-
ate and disseminate works). But how the grant of an extended copyright term to works already
in existence on the date of the legislative enactment can operate as any incentive to creativity
remains a deep mystery.
49. See Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing
Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97
MICH. L. REV. 985 (1999) (arguing that offering incremental benefits to patentees yields only
marginally increased incentives for invention, but results in disproportionate welfare losses to
consumers).
50. See White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Overpro-
tecting intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it .... Culture, like science and
technology, grows by accretion, each new creator building on the works of those who came
before. Overprotection stifles the very creative forces it's supposed to nurture.") (Kosinski, J.,
dissenting from order rejecting suggestion for rehearing en banc); Marina Lao, Unilateral Refus-
als to Sell or License Intellectual Property and the Antitrust Duty to Deal, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PuB.
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tection would lead to enhanced innovation, the trade-off in harm to
the public that would result from that greater measure of protection
has been deemed unacceptable because it would inappropriately in-
crease the degree to which unrestricted public access to those inven-
tions or works would be foreclosed. Not only does a longer term have
the obvious effect of extending the duration of the patent or copyright
monopoly, but it also extends the period during which others may not
make variations, "improvements," or other kinds of derivative works
of the original work, thus decreasing innovation and product variety in
adjacent areas.51
The specific underlying question raised by Image Technical and
Xerox, then, was what measure of protection must be afforded to the
manufacturer of copying machines to stimulate the optimal produc-
tion of those particular products. The solution I propose, which is
consistent with both antitrust and intellectual property doctrines, is
that the manufacturer should be allowed to reap its monopoly on the
protected product, but should not be allowed to extend that monopoly
into other, adjacent markets. 52 Because these refusals to deal in fact
allowed Kodak and Xerox to exclude competition in the service mar-
ket as an extension of their lawful monopoly in the upstream machine
market, the holding in Xerox led to a form of over-incentivizing the
creation of patentable machines or machine parts. Allowing Xerox to
expand its share of the service market, at the expense of otherwise
POL'Y 193, 216 (1999) ("[I]f competition is as much, if not more, of a stimulus for innovation as
patent protection, then less intellectual property protection might actually increase, not de-
crease, innovation .... [I]t does not necessarily follow that the broader the scope of protection,
the higher the rate of innovation.") (internal citations omitted); Melamed & Stoeppelwerth,
supra note 27, at 416 ("[O]verly broad intellectual property rights can retard innovation by, for
example, inhibiting the development of improvement patents and derivative copyright works
.. ") (footnote omitted).
51. See Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54
DUKE L.J. 1, 46-48 (2004) (identifying "innovation bottlenecks" that result from grants of patent
rights).
52. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990). In
Atari Games, the court stated:
[A] patent owner may not take the property right granted by a patent and use it to
extend his power in the marketplace improperly, i.e. beyond the limits of what Con-
gress intended to give in the patent laws. The fact that a patent is obtained does not
wholly insulate the patent owner from the antitrust laws.... When a patent owner uses
his patent rights not only as a shield to protect his invention, but as a sword to eviscer-
ate competition unfairly, that owner may be found to have abused the grant and may
become liable for antitrust violations when sufficient power in the relevant market is
present.
Id.
The antitrust doctrines proscribing the improper extension of the scope of a patent or copy-
right into an adjacent market are discussed in more detail infra Part VI.D.
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competitive ISOs, resulted only in net harm to consumers. Therefore,
those refusals to deal were properly limited by Image Technical be-
cause they could not be based on a legitimate concern to protect Ko-
dak's intellectual property, as opposed to a desire to protect or extend
its market position in the service market.
V. STATUTES AND CASE LAW UNDER ANTITRUST AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIMES
If the result is correct as a matter of public policy, the next question
is whether case law-both in the antitrust and the intellectual prop-
erty areas-supports this result. Here, I recognize that the law is am-
biguous. But, because the rule for which I argue does have solid
support in the case law, it follows that the policies I have just de-
scribed commend the result reached by the Ninth Circuit.
A. Antitrust
One of the basic principles of antitrust law is stated in the Colgate
doctrine. 53 Over eighty-five years ago, the Supreme Court held that a
firm's unilateral decision as to the entities to which it will or will not
sell can never violate § 1 of the Sherman Act.54 But this conclusion is
quite unremarkable because § 1, which by definition only applies to a
"contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade, '55 re-
quires particular behavior by at least two parties.56 What is signifi-
cant, however, is that in the preambulary language in the key sentence
in Colgate-"[i]n the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a
monopoly" 57-the Court simultaneously recognized that certain uni-
lateral refusals to deal, while not violating § 1, could be a predicate
element of a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.58
53. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
54. The oft-quoted rule is as follows:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act does not restrict
the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private busi-
ness, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will
deal. And, of course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under which he
will refuse to sell.
Id. at 307 (emphasis added).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
56. The question of what behavior by a seller will permit the inference of agreement is one of
the thorniest issues of antitrust, and it is far beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
57. See supra note 54.
58. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483 n.32 (1992) ("It is
true that as a general matter a firm can refuse to deal with its competitors. But such a right is
not absolute; it exists only if there are legitimate competitive reasons for the refusal.").
[Vol. 55:12111226
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In addition to condemning certain unilateral refusals to deal be-
cause they allow a firm to obtain or retain monopoly power, the anti-
trust laws may, on occasion, also impose an affirmative duty on the
offending firm to deal with others because the goods or services that
the firm would otherwise choose to withhold are necessary for vigor-
ous competition. One theory that has been proffered to identify those
situations in which such a duty to deal exists is the so-called essential
facilities doctrine.5 9 Other theories include characterizing the refusal
59. See Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174, 179-80 (2d Cir.
1990) (finding that railroad's demand for 800% increase in amount of fee that competitor had to
pay for right to use defendant's tracks raised factual questions of denial of essential facility), cert.
denied, 500 U.S. 928 (1991); Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 539-40 (7th Cir. 1986)
(holding that under essential facilities doctrine, owner of sports arena would be required to share
access to arena with competitor seeking to obtain professional basketball franchise); Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1520-21 (10th Cir. 1984) (imposing
duty on operator of three ski areas to continue marketing of multi-day, multi-mountain ski ticket
because it was an essential facility for operator of fourth mountain to be able to continue to
compete), affd, 472 U.S. 585 (1985); MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33
(7th Cir. 1983) (setting out frequently quoted four-part test for essential facility doctrine and
holding that AT&T's refusal to interconnect would-be long-lines competitor with the local distri-
bution facilities of AT&T's Bell operating companies provided predicate for finding of unlawful
monopolization), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843,
854-62 (6th Cir. 1979) (remanding for factual determination of defendant-distributor's market
power, motivation, and possible efficiency justifications and for determination of whether its
refusal to continue dealing with former customer might be denial of essential facility because
plaintiff could not continue in business absent access to goods sold by distributor). One court
stated:
[B]ecause the Bell system (with its Operating Companies) possesses a monopoly in the
distribution of local telecommunications services, meaningful competition in the provi-
sion of intercity services is precluded unless the non-Bell carriers are able to obtain
interconnection with the Bell local distribution facilities .... In the view of the Court, it
is clear that the local facilities controlled by Bell are "essential facilities" ... and...
defendants are obligated to provide the kind of non-discriminatory access which the
cases contemplate.
United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1352-53 (D.D.C. 1981) (internal citations omitted).
See also Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1356-59 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (recognizing
essential facility doctrine but declining to apply it where parties were not competitors); Image
Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1209-11 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing
doctrine but declining to apply it because monopolization was provable under other theories),
cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1094 (1998); City of Anaheim v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1379-81
(9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing doctrine but declining to apply it because defendant had legitimate
business reasons for not dealing with plaintiff); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992-93
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding that a restrictive covenant in lease between stadium board and football
team would constitute § 1 violation if evidence demonstrated that stadium was essential facility
for plaintiff-applicant to obtain franchise in rival football league).
The essential facilities doctrine, or "bottleneck doctrine," traces its heritage to United States v.
Terminal Railroad Association, 224 U.S. 383 (1912)-a case involving a concerted refusal to deal
by a group of railroad companies with control of the only bridges over the Mississippi River in
the St. Louis area. The bridges were deemed essential for would-be entrants to be able to com-
pete. The Court held that the defendants had a duty to permit competitors access to these facili-
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to deal as predatory or exclusionary, 60 or describing the refusal as a
form of "leveraging," which involves the use by a firm of its market
power in one market as the springboard for attempting to obtain mo-
nopoly power in a second market.61
Admittedly, as discussed below, the essential facilities theory has
recently been called into serious question by Trinko,62 and the lever-
ties on reasonable terms. See generally Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of
Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1990).
60. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. 585 (condemning refusal by operator of three ski moun-
tains to continue multi-day, multi-mountain ski ticket arrangement with operator of fourth ski
area, in light of evidence that defendant had no legitimate business justification for refusal but
rather wanted to drive plaintiff out of business); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S.
143 (1951) (finding an unlawful attempt to monopolize where newspaper refused to accept ad-
vertising from companies that placed ads on local radio station due to a predatory intent to
drive station out of business); Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 973
(10th Cir. 1990) (finding willful maintenance of monopoly power where healthcare financing
organization threatened to terminate hospital's contracting provider agreement with intent to
coerce other hospitals into not doing business with defendant's competitors), cert. denied, 497
U.S. 1005 (1990); Gen. Indus. Corp. v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 810 F.2d 795, 801-04 (8th Cir.
1987) (supporting a finding of unlawful attempt to monopolize and labeling conduct as predatory
and exclusionary where manufacturer changed credit terms and terminated plaintiff-distributor
because it was carrying products of competing manufacturers); Six Twenty-Nine Prods., Inc. v.
Rollins Telecasting, Inc., 365 F.2d 478, 481-83 (5th Cir. 1966) (finding a § 2 claim where the only
television station in market refused to accept commercials submitted by the plaintiff advertising
agency with intent to drive the plaintiff out of business and possibly to extend its broadcasting
monopoly to advertising market). See also High Tech. Careers v. San Jose Mercury News, 996
F.2d 987 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding a newspaper's refusal to continue to carry plaintiff's advertising
inserts for job fairs organized by plaintiff would constitute unlawful monopolization unless justi-
fied by legitimate business reasons).
61. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 480-86 (1992)
(allegations that manufacturer of copying equipment refused to sell replacement parts to inde-
pendent servicing organizations, which were engaged in repair of that equipment, thereby al-
lowing manufacturer to strengthen its monopoly position in market for repair of its equipment,
stated claim of unlawful monopolization or attempt to monopolize); supra notes 7-18 (discussing
Eastman Kodak after remand); see also Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366
(1973) (finding that utility's refusal to sell electricity at wholesale to municipalities or to transmit
("wheel") electricity over utility's high transmission lines-an attempt to regain monopolies for
retail sale of electricity-violated § 2; approving district court's order, requiring utility to sell, or
wheel, electricity); Eastman Kodak Co. v. S. Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927) (finding a
§ 2 violation where defendant-manufacturer refused to continue selling supplies to plaintiff-re-
tailer after plaintiff had rejected defendant's offer to buy its business and defendant had intent to
extend its monopoly into retail market as shown by evidence). Cf. United States v. Griffith, 334
U.S. 100, 107-08 (1948) (holding that movie exhibitor's block booking, by obtaining exclusive
first-run clearances for its entire circuit, constituted unlawful use of market power in "closed"
towns to obtain monopoly power in "competitive" towns: "When the buying power of the entire
circuit is used to negotiate films for his competitive as well as his closed towns, he is using
monopoly power to expand his empire").
62. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398, 410-11
(2004) (discussed infra notes 129-34 and accompanying text). Cf. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra
note 26, § 13.3c2 (suggesting that, with certain narrow limitations, "[w]here an essential facilities
claim is premised solely on ownership of an intellectual property right (the 'essential' facility) by
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aging theory has been challenged by the Chicago School as economi-
cally unrealistic.63 Additionally, it may sometimes be difficult to
identify those refusals to deal that are predatory, exclusionary, or in-
volve unlawful attempts to leverage market power. Nonetheless,
there is both extensive case law 64 and extensive support in the anti-
trust literature,65 under all these theories, for condemning certain in-
stances of refusals to deal and then for requiring the firm to deal with
competitors, customers, or suppliers, and for imposing monetary dam-
ages incurred as a result of that refusal to deal. In short, antitrust law
clearly recognizes that on occasion, consumer welfare will be ad-
vanced by denying a firm the unbridled discretion to refuse to deal
with others.
I want to be clear that, just as the owner of an unpatented product
normally is under no duty to deal with others, I do not suggest that
there is a generalized duty on the part of all owners of patents or
copyrights to license their intellectual property to their competitors.
As in any other situation, for a duty to deal to exist, a court would
have to find all the elements of an antitrust violation, based either on
a monopolization or an attempt to monopolize theory.66 But the key
point is the fact that the property being withheld from competitors is a
a vertically integrated monopolist... we believe the purposes of antitrust law are best served by
denying such a claim outright").
63. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
(1978); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19
(1957). But see Warren S. Grimes, Antitrust and the Systematic Bias Against Small Business:
Kodak, Strategic Conduct, and Leverage Theory, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 231, 253-61 (2001)
(identifying crucial flaws in Bowman's critique); Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power
Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515 (1985) (explaining why leverage theory retains vital-
ity and how use of leverage may have serious anticompetitive effects).
64. In addition to cases cited supra notes 59-61, see Bellsouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Don-
nelley Info. Publ'g, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 1551, 1566 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (holding that whether copy-
righted telephone directory constituted essential facility, thereby requiring publisher of directory
to share contents with would-be competitor, raised material issues of fact, precluding summary
judgment), rev'd on other grounds, 999 F.2d 1436, 1439 n.5 (11th Cir. 1993).
65. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Promoting Innovation Competition Through the Aspen/Ko-
dak Rule, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 495 (1999) (endorsing a rule for certain industries dominated
by a single firm, that proscribes exclusionary conduct by a firm that exploits complementary or
collaborative relationship, in absence of satisfactory business justification); Kaplow, supra note
63, at 516 (presenting "factors indicating that leverage, even when understood as extension of
monopoly power, is possible in practice"); Robert Pitofsky et al., The Essential Facilities Doctrine
Under U.S. Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 452-58 (2002) (approving extension of essen-
tial facilities doctrine to certain refusals to provide access to intellectual property).
66. See Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publ'ns, Inc., 957 F.2d 765, 768 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating
that "[a] refusal to deal may be one of the mechanisms by which a monopolist maintains its
power," but concluding that copyright owner's refusal to grant license to its competitor was not
unlawful, because refusal did not have anticompetitive effect), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 984 (1992).
Cf. PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 821-22 (6th Cir. 1997) (manufacturer
of industrial control equipment did not engage in unlawful monopolization by its refusal to sell
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patent or copyright should not remove the refusal to deal from the
same kind of antitrust scrutiny. Rather, regardless of whether the
product being withheld is the subject of intellectual property protec-
tion, there is sound authority for the proposition that, in appropriate
cases, a refusal to deal can satisfy the conduct component of the plain-
tiff's § 2 claim, giving rise to a duty to deal.
In both Image Technical and Xerox, the particular refusals to deal
by these defendants supported a finding of a § 2 violation.67 Because
the right to exclude granted by a patent or copyright confers at least a
limited form of monopoly-although the subject of that monopoly
may fall short of a "relevant market" for other purposes-the owner
of a patent or copyright often will enjoy significant market power.68 If
access to that intellectual property is necessary for others to be able to
compete for customers in that market, and if alternative technologies
are not adequate substitutes, in certain circumstances a court might
properly conclude that the refusal to deal in that property is unlawful,
to the same extent that it would reach that conclusion for a refusal to
deal in unpatented or uncopyrighted products. Therefore, my conten-
tion is that the mere fact that the product being withheld is intellectual
property should not automatically immunize the defendant from pos-
sible antitrust liability, 69 nor should it preclude an order requiring the
defendant to deal with its competitors with respect to that intellectual
property.70 Indeed, the guidelines issued by the federal antitrust en-
forcement agencies indicate a general policy of denying different
treatment to intellectual property than is given to other forms of prop-
unpatented circuit boards to plaintiff repair service company where relevant market was primary
equipment market, not service market, and defendant lacked market power in that market).
67. For example, in Image Technical, the court of appeals stated that "[in the service market,
Kodak repairs at least 80% of the machines it manufactures." 125 F.3d 1195, 1200-01 (9th Cir.
1997). Indeed, the Supreme Court found that "Kodak provides 80% to 95% of the service for
Kodak machines." 504 U.S. 451, 457 (1992). Kodak and its authorized suppliers accounted for
100% of the parts used in the repair of those machines. Id. at 481. The Supreme Court found
that the plaintiffs presented a "triable claim" in alleging that Kodak replacement parts and the
repair of Kodak machines properly constituted separate, relevant markets. Id. These very high
market shares almost certainly would confer monopoly power; therefore, a finding of an unjusti-
fied refusal to deal would support a.conclusion of unlawful monopoly maintenance.
68. See infra note 121 and accompanying text (describing presumption of market power given
to ownership of intellectual property in tying arrangement cases).
69. See United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948) ("It is equally well settled
that the possession of a valid patent or patents does not give the patentee any exemption from
the provisions of the Sherman Act beyond the limits of the patent monopoly."). Accord United
States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342U.S. 371, 378 (1952).
70. Cf Associated Press v. United States,.326 U.S. 1 (1945) (finding that bylaws of member-
ship organization of major daily newspapers that restricted admission of other newspapers into
organization violated Sherman § 1 and requiring change in bylaws and sharing of copyrighted
news articles with competitors on reasonable terms).
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erty when evaluating the legality of the behavior under scrutiny.71
Therefore, it follows that the antitrust laws may properly be used to
proscribe the use of intellectual property as a means of obtaining mar-
ket power in an area outside the scope of the patent or copyright
monopoly.72
B. Patent and Copyright
Yet, these antitrust principles assertedly come into conflict with
rules under the patent and copyright laws. In contrast to the antitrust
rules just described, the default principles of the intellectual property
regime give significant discretion to patent and copyright owners. The
copyright laws specifically afford a number of exclusive rights to the
copyright owner. Title to the copyright vests initially in the author of
the work. 73 He or she (or it) has the "exclusive rights to do and to
authorize" a variety of acts, including making copies of the work and
then distributing those copies by sale, lease, or gift.74 These rights
may be divided temporally, geographically, or in other ways, and they
can be transferred in whole or in part to others through sale, license,
gift, or bequest.75 Finally, the copyright owner can decide to do none
of these, instead keeping the work private and not making or distrib-
uting any copies. 76
71. The guidelines state as follows:
The Agencies apply the same general antitrust principles to conduct involving intellec-
tual property that they apply to conduct involving any other form of tangible or intangi-
ble property .... Intellectual property has important characteristics ... that distinguish
it from many other forms of property. These characteristics can be taken into account
by standard antitrust analysis, however, and do not require the application of funda-
mentally different principles.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY § 2.1 (1995) (internal citations omitted).
See generally Daniel J. Gifford, Antitrust's Troubled Relations with Intellectual Property, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1695, 1710-11, 1718 (2003) (indicating that Congress has generally sought to have
courts "treat intellectual property in the same way that they treat any [other form of] property");
Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From Separate
Spheres to Unified Field, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167, 228 (1997) ("The Guidelines reflect a move-
ment from the 'separate spheres' model . .. to a model positing that intellectual property is
essentially similar to other forms of property.").
72. Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1216 (9th Cir. 1997)
("[A] monopolist who acquires a dominant position in one market through patents and copy-
rights may violate § 2 if the monopolist exploits that dominant position to enhance a monopoly
in another market."), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1094 (1998).
73. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000).
74. Id. § 106.
75. Id. § 201(d).
76. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228-29 (1990) ("[N]othing in the copyright statutes
would prevent an author from hoarding all of his works during the term of the copyright."); Fox
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("The owner of the copyright, if he pleases, may
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The patent laws do not provide a comparable enumeration of rights.
Rather, the patent laws give the patentee "the right to exclude others
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention . . .77
The right to make, use, and sell a product or process is inherent in its
creation and ownership; it is a natural right of everybody, but is given
exclusively to the patent owner for a limited period of time.78 And as
with the copyright, the patent owner has the right to suppress, rather
than to exploit, its patent.79
VI. HARMONIZING ANTITRUST AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY VALUES
How can these apparently conflicting principles-the occasional
duty to deal imposed by the antitrust laws and the bundle of exclusive
rights given by the patent and copyright laws-be reconciled? Why
do I argue for recognizing a duty of the owner of intellectual property,
in appropriate circumstances, to sell the protected property, license its
technology to others, share its copyrighted materials, and the like? As
already noted, this conclusion is supported by public policy analysis,
the applicable statutes, and interpretive case law. In this Part, I fur-
ther consider the policy and case law of both regimes, to harmonize
any apparent conflicts.
A. General Limitations on Intellectual Property Rights
The basis for imposing this occasional duty is that both the patent
and the copyright laws recognize that there are important limitations
on the rights of the owners of that intellectual property. An apprecia-
tion of this principle will foster the harmonization of the apparent
conflict between the antitrust and intellectual property regimes rather
than a subordination of one of them to the other.80
refrain from vending or licensing and content himself with simply exercising the right to exclude
others from using his property.").
77. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
78. The court in Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell explained:
The right to make, use and sell an invented article is not derived from the patent law.
This right existed before and without the passage of the law and was always the right of
an inventor. The act secured to the inventor the exclusive right to make, use and vend
the thing patented, and consequently to prevent others from exercising like privileges
without the consent of the patentee.
Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913).
79. Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908).
80. There is no basis for the suggestion that the patent and copyright laws carve out some
"exception" from the normal operation of antitrust rules. To the contrary, the Supreme Court
has asserted on multiple occasions: "[E]xemptions from the antitrust laws are strictly construed
and strongly disfavored." Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409,
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As one example of the limits on the rights of intellectual property
owners, both regimes contain a "first sale" doctrine. Although there
is typically no imperative to sell the protected product,8' the lawful
owner of a lawfully made copy of a patented or copyrighted product
has the right to resell, otherwise transfer, or even to destroy that copy
without obtaining permission from the author or inventor.82 As an-
other example, both regimes also impose compulsory licenses on the
owners of their intellectual property, requiring them to deal with spec-
ified individuals under specified conditions. Thus, the copyright laws
set forth a variety of situations in which a compulsory license will be
imposed on the copyright owner,83 and a handful of statutes also pro-
vide for the possibility of compulsory licensing of patents with respect
to specific categories of inventions.84 In addition, on several occa-
sions, courts have upheld compulsory licensing as a remedy for viola-
tions of the antitrust laws.8 5
421 (1986). Accord Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372 (1973); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963) (citing multiple cases).
81. See supra notes 76, 79 and accompanying text.
82. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000) ("[Tihe owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully
made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority
of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or pho-
norecord."). A modest limitation on this right of the owner of a copy of a work is found in the
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 106A). This statute gives the author of a work of visual art some limited rights "to prevent any
intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work ....... 17 U.S.C.
§ 106A(a)(3).
Under the patent laws, the first-sale (or exhaustion) doctrine establishes that "an authorized
sale of a patented product places that product beyond the reach of the patent .... The patent
owner's rights with respect to the product end with its sale,... and a purchaser of such a product
may use or resell the product free of the patent ...." Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995
F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (internal citations omitted), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1092 (1994).
83. See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (secondary transmissions by cable television systems); id. § 112(e)
(backup phonorecord of certain sound recordings); id. § 114 (d)-(j) (performance rights for digi-
tal audio transmissions); id. § 115 (nondramatic musical works embodied in phonorecords); id.
§ 118 (noncommercial broadcasting); id. § 119 ("secondary transmissions by satellite carriers");
17 U.S.C. § 122 (same).
84. See 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (2000) (authorizing Atomic Energy Commission to "declare any pat-
ent to be affected with the public interest if (1) the invention or discovery covered by the patent
is of primary importance in the production or utilization of special nuclear material or atomic
energy" and to require licensing of that invention); id. § 7608 (authorizing the Attorney General,
upon making a determination that access to a patent is necessary to permit compliance with air
pollution and emission standards, to petition a district court to "issue an order requiring the
person who owns such patent to license it ....").
85. See, e.g., United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd. 410 U.S. 52 (1973), discussed infra notes
125-28 and accompanying text. Cf. Constance E. Bagley & Gavin Clarkson, Adverse Possession
for Intellectual Property: Adapting an Ancient Concept to Resolve Conflicts Between Antitrust and
Intellectual Property Laws in the Information Age, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 327, 392 (2003) (not-
ing that: "[Ilntellectual property owners should be rightfully entitled to claim the full scope of
their property grant ...."). The authors qualified their premise "by introducing a concept of
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B. Other Limits on Patent and Copyright Grants
Another limitation on the owner of intellectual property, which is
important for my argument here, begins with the basic and longstand-
ing rule that the rights granted by a patent or copyright obviously
have boundaries-there are significant and defined limits on these
grants of power.8 6 In particular, ownership of a patent or copyright
does not give to the owner the right to extend the federally protected
monopoly into adjacent markets.8 7 This means that despite the Xerox
court's assumptions, the owner of these rights does not have the unbri-
dled power to make profits by whatever means it chooses, such as by
controlling sales of products or services in whatever other markets the
patented product or copyrighted work may be used, and by asserting
the unbounded right to withhold access to its property. Rather, the
implicit understanding is that the rewards from exploiting only the
patent or copyright itself are sufficient incentive to stimulate innova-
tion and creativity.
The D.C. Circuit recently restated this fundamental proposition in
the Microsoft case: "Intellectual property rights do not confer a privi-
lege to violate the antitrust laws."'8 8 Indeed, the attempt to extend the
patent or copyright beyond the statutorily conferred right may consti-
tute "abuse," subjecting the party engaged in that behavior to a vari-
ety of remedies-ranging from the inability to enforce the copyright
or patent against alleged infringers, to mandated licensing of the intel-
lectual property right to others.
adverse possession for intellectual property as a restriction on certain activities that would other-
wise be within the scope of the intellectual property grant." Id.
86. See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 221 (1980) ("The policy of free
competition runs deep in our law[.] It underlies both the doctrine of patent misuse and the
general principle that the boundary of a patent monopoly is to be limited by the literal scope of
the patent claims."); Zenith Radio Corp: v. Hazeltine Res., Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 136 (1969)
("[T]here are established limits which the patentee must not exceed in employing the leverage of
his patent .... ).
87. See, e.g., Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961) (finding
that plaintiff's patent on convertible folding top for automobiles was not infringed by replace-
ment of worn top by new top manufactured by defendant; replacement of fabric constituted
permissible, noninfringing "repair," rather than infringing "reconstruction").
88. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting In re Indep.
Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Microsoft had claimed "an
absolute and unfettered right to use its intellectual property as it wishes: '[I]f intellectual prop-
erty rights have been lawfully acquired,' it says, then 'their subsequent exercise cannot give rise
to antitrust liability.'" Id. The court of appeals' response to this argument was to characterize it
as "border[ing] upon the frivolous .... That is no more correct than the proposition that use of
one's personal property, such as a baseball bat, cannot give rise to tort liability." Id.
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C. Patent and Copyright Misuse
The scope of the patent and copyright "misuse" doctrine is impre-
cise and shifting. Neither the patent nor the copyright statutes have
explicit provisions defining misuse,89 much less any that set forth the
consequences of that behavior. But case law under both regimes iden-
tifies various kinds of behavior-most frequently, but not exclusively,
that of an anticompetitive nature-that will divest the patent or copy-
right holder of the rights otherwise conferred by law.
As discussed in more detail below, 90 one aspect of public policy ap-
plicable to intellectual property is the condemnation of attempts by
the owner of that property to extend its statutory monopoly outside
the scope of the grant. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to conclude
that when the owner of a patent on a product, or of a copyright used
in the servicing of that product, attempts to refuse to deal with com-
petitors in order to extend its monopoly into the otherwise competi-
tive service market for its product, the owner is engaged in behavior
that is violative of public policy, and thus is engaged in patent or copy-
right misuse.
At its most basic level, the patent misuse doctrine will preclude the
patent holder, which has engaged in unlawful behavior, from enforc-
ing its patent against infringers. 91 For example, in Morton Salt Co. v.
G. S. Suppiger,92 the plaintiff owned patents on machines used in the
injection of salt in canned foods. In a fact pattern evocative of the
later International Salt case,93 Morton insisted that lessees of its ma-
chines use exclusively its unpatented salt tablets. The defendant man-
ufactured and sold unpatented machines, which allegedly infringed
the plaintiff's patents. Applying principles of equity-that a court will
not lend its assistance to a party with unclean hands-the Supreme
Court held that because the plaintiff's conduct violated the antitrust
89. The patent statute contains a provision, found in 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2000), specifying
certain kinds of conduct which do not constitute misuse. This provision is discussed infra notes
102-10 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 118-123 and accompanying text.
91. See United States Gypsum Co. v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957) ("It is now,
of course, familiar law that the courts will not aid a patent owner who has misused his patents to
recover any of their emoluments accruing during the period of misuse or thereafter until the
effects of such use have been dissipated. ... ); DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS
§ 19.04 (2005) ("A patent owner may exploit a patent in an improper manner by violating the
antitrust laws or extending the patent beyond its lawful scope. If such misuse is found, the courts
will withhold any remedy for infringement or breach of a license agreement .....
92. 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
93. Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); see infra note 119 and accompanying
text.
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laws, relief against the alleged infringement was unavailable. 94 Be-
cause the plaintiff had attempted to use its patent monopoly to limit
competition in a market outside the scope of the patent grant, the
Court upheld the remedy of the unenforceability of the patent, even
in an area that was within the statutory grant.95
In a more recent decision, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Re-
search, Inc. ,96 defendant Hazeltine Research (HRI), the patent owner,
had insisted on licensing, only as part of a package, patents that were
needed by Zenith in the manufacture of radios and televisions. The
fees were calculated as a percentage of Zenith's total sales, without
regard to Zenith's use of particular patents. The district court had
found that HRI's conduct constituted patent misconduct, and this
finding formed the predicate of an antitrust violation. The treble
damages award to Zenith was affirmed by the court of appeals, and
the decision to grant treble damages was not reviewed by the Supreme
Court.97 But in reviewing the decision on the patent misconduct and
the antitrust violation, the Court explicitly found that HRI's conduct
constituted patent misuse, 98 potentially supporting both the unen-
forceability of the patents and the entry of injunctive relief.99 Other
cases have found a wide variety of other forms of conduct constitute
patent "misuse." 100
94. The Morton Salt Court concluded:
It is unnecessary to decide whether respondent has violated the Clayton Act, for we
conclude that in any event the maintenance of the present suit to restrain petitioner's
manufacture or sale of the alleged infringing machines is contrary to public policy and
that the district court rightly dismissed the complaint for want of equity.
Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494.
95. The Court explained:
A patent operates to create and grant to the patentee an exclusive right to make, use
and vend the particular device described and claimed in the patent. But a patent af-
fords no immunity for a monopoly not within the grant.., and the use of it to suppress
competition in the sale of an unpatented article may deprive the patentee of the aid of
a court of equity to restrain an alleged infringement by one who is a competitor.
Id. at 491 (internal citations omitted).
96. 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
97. Id. at 133.
98. Id. at 135 ("We hold that conditioning the grant of a patent license upon payment of
royalties on products which do not use the teaching of the patent does amount to patent mis-
use."); see also id. at 139 ("We also think patent misuse inheres in a patentee's insistence on a
percentage-of-sales royalty, regardless of use, and his rejection of licensee proposals to pay only
for actual use.").
99. The injunction would have barred HRI from conditioning the licensing of its patent on
Zenith's obtaining a license for other patents. Id. at 133-34.
100. See Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding patent misuse in a
patent holder's policy of tying the right to use a patented process to the leasing of a machine to
carry out that process); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir.
1970) (remanding for a determination on the factual question of misuse where the calculation of
1236
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Subsequent to those earlier cases, the patent misuse doctrine has
been subject to limitation both in the courts'01 and as a result of statu-
tory amendments. The original exemptive provisions, found in the
Patent Act of 1952,102 identified three forms of conduct that would not
be considered misuse. 103 None of these three forms of conduct, how-
ever, has any relevance to the refusal by a patent owner to sell its
patented product.10 4
royalties under a licensing agreement of apparatus applied regardless of whether apparatus was
covered by any sublicensed patent rights). See also CHISUM, supra note 91, § 19.04[3] (identify-
ing a great variety of acts which have been held to be patent misuse).
101. See, e.g., Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 703-09 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001-02 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 477 U.S.
905 (1986); USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 510-14 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1107 (1983). See also Mark A. Lemley, Comment, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent
Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1599, 1599 (1990) (concluding "that the patent misuse doctrine
ought to be abolished, and that the antitrust laws can serve the same purposes that the patent
misuse doctrine was designed to serve").
102. Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792, 811 (1952).
103. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2000) states:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringe-
ment of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of
the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following: (1) derived
revenue from acts which if performed by another without his consent would constitute
contributory infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform
acts which if performed without his consent would constitute contributory infringement
of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against infringement or contribu-
tory infringement ....
Id.
104. In a series of cases culminating with Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S.
661 (1944), the Supreme Court had limited and ultimately cast serious doubt on the right of a
patent owner to bring an action under a contributory infringement theory when the patent
owner sought to use its patent to control the market for a non-patented product. As a partial
overruling of those cases, the main portion of § 271 provides both that "[w]hoever actively in-
duces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer," 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), and that cer-
tain specified conduct shall make a person "liable as a contributory infringer." Id. § 271(c).
The purpose of § 271(d) was to make it clear that persons exercising certain rights conferred
on them by the patent statutes, including the right to bring suit against either a direct or contrib-
utory infringer, were engaged in lawful behavior. As indicated by the legislative history of § 271,
"[tihe last paragraph of this section [§271(d)] provides that one who merely does what he is
authorized to do by statute is not guilty of misuse of the patent." S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 8
(1952). Accord H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 28 (1952).
See Rohm & Hass Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 599 F.2d 685, 688 (5th Cir. 1979) ("§ 271(d)
reverses the Mercoid misuse doctrine"), affd, Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S.
176, 201, 213 (1980) (containing extensive analysis of legislative history of § 271 and stating "the
provisions of § 271(d) effectively confer upon the patentee, as a lawful adjunct of his patent
rights, a limited power to exclude others from competition in nonstaple goods"). See also, Daw-
son Chemical, 448 U.S. at 213 ("[B]y enacting §§ 271(c) and (d), Congress granted to patent
holders a statutory right to control nonstaple goods that are capable only of infringing use in a
patented invention, and that are essential to that invention's advance over prior art."); Stearns v.
Tinker & Rasor, 252 F.2d 589, 600-02 (9th Cir. 1958) (noting that § 271 was enacted in response
to Mercoid).
One author has written:
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In 1988, as part of the Patent and Trademark Office Authorization
Act, this statute was amended to identify two additional forms of be-
havior that would not be treated as patent misuse.10 5 These two in-
stances were "refus[ing] to license or use any rights to the patent," 1°6
and
condition[ing] the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of
the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in.an-
other patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of
the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the rele-
vant market for the patent or patented product on which the license
or sale is conditioned. 10 7
But even these more recently added provisions are not inconsistent
with my assertion that certain refusals by the patent owner to sell
products manufactured under the patent may constitute patent misuse
and may also form the basis for antitrust liability. First of all, by their
express language, these provisions, which refer to a refusal to license
patent rights, do not extend to refusals to sell a product that was man-
ufactured pursuant to or that incorporates the patent. To the con-
trary, this provision is silent on the legality of the refusal to sell
patented products as part of an attempt to extend the patent owner's
monopoly into an unprotected market. Second, the legislative history
of these provisions makes clear that they were not designed as broad
exemptions from the antitrust laws, defining specific forms of conduct
that allegedly did not have anticompetitive effects.10 Rather, they
were intended only to address the significance, in patent infringement
actions, of refusals to license and the perceived problematic judicial
condemnation, under a per se approach, of tying arrangements involv-
[M]isuse is not ruled out entirely [by § 271]. That would have been unsound. It has a
proper place in the law .... Only appropriate exceptions have been made to it, not to
revive every type of "contributory infringement" against which the courts have from
time to time seen fit to grant recovery, but only those types which it was felt are in
accord with the fundamental idea of protecting patentees in what they have actually
invented ....
See generally Giles S. Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 35 J.
PATENT OFF. Soc'y 476, 490-91 (1953).
105. Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, Title II, § 201, 102 Stat. 4676
(1988). See generally Richard Calkins, Patent Law: The Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform
Act and Noerr-Pennington Doctrine on Misuse Defenses and Antitrust Counterclaims, 38 DRAKE
L. REV. 175 (1988-1989).
106. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2000).
107. Id. § 271(d)(5).
108. See Lao, supra note 50, at 206-09; see id. at 209 (asserting that language in Patent Reform
Act "demonstrates that Congress intended to confine the application of the amendments to pat-
ent cases, without affecting antitrust rules").
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ing patented products. 109 Third, the patent misuse doctrine not only
reflects the competition policies advanced by the antitrust laws, but on
occasion the doctrine may even go beyond them. As has been noted,
"the patentee's act may constitute patent misuse without rising to the
level of an antitrust violation."'110 Thus, the proposition that certain
conduct-including such refusals to deal-constitutes "patent mis-
use," and that such conduct will result in an abridgement of the rights
otherwise afforded to the patent owner, retains vitality. And because
a finding of patent misuse will render the patent unenforceable
against an infringer, it also follows that if the other elements of an
antitrust violation are proven, the owner of a patent who has engaged
in such misuse should have the same duty to sell its product to others
as would the owner of an unpatented product.
109. The Senate version of the bill that was ultimately enacted would have been considerably
broader. It would have provided that:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringe-
ment of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of
the patent right by reason of his or her licensing practices or actions or inactions relating
to his or her patent, unless such practices or actions or inactions, in view of the circum-
stances in which such practices or actions or inactions are employed, violate the anti-
trust laws.
S. REP. No. 100-492, at 17-18 (1988) (emphasis added).
The House version of the bill, H.R. 4972, 100th Cong. (1988), contained the language in the
enacted version, and the Senate acceded to that version. See 134 CONG. REC. 32,470 (1988).
In the floor debates on the day the Senate passed the bill, Senator DeConcini, one of the bill's
sponsors, stated that "[wihile I support the bill before us, I emphasize, Mr. President, that it
deals only with a small piece of the patent misuse problem-tying arrangements-and leaves the
rest for us to address in the future." Id. at 32,471 (statement of Sen. DeConcini). Another of the
bill's sponsors, Senator Leahy, made similar observations:
This legislation differs from previous proposals in two important respects: First, the
patent misuse doctrine is no longer reformed across the board, but only as it relates to
refusals to license or use patents, and to tying arrangements. Second, as the misuse
doctrine is applied to tying, the generic antitrust violation standard adopted by the
Senate has been replaced by a market power test.
Id. (statement of Sen. Leahy).
Despite Senator DeConcini's prediction, there have been no further amendments to the statute.
See also Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1214 n.7 (9th Cir.
1997) (rejecting the argument that this amendment heralded the prohibition of all antitrust
claims premised on "refusal to license a patent" and asserting that various commentators recog-
nize that the statute "merely codified existing law"), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1094 (1998).
110. Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140 (1969)). Accord In re Indep. Serv. Orgs.
Antitrust Litig., 964 F. Supp. 1454, 1458-59 (D. Kan. 1997). See also Robin C. Feldman, The
Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399 (2003) (criticizing
recent Federal Circuit decisions, see supra note 101, limiting the scope of the patent misuse
doctrine and arguing that restricting misuse to conduct which violates the antitrust laws is incon-
sistent with the policies underlying the patent regime); Note, Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obso-
lete?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1922, 1922 (1997) ("Even after Mallinckrodt [Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976
F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992)], patent misuse still retains unique doctrinal features .... This differ-
ence gives the misuse defense a larger scope than the antitrust laws .... ").
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Although the copyright misuse doctrine was embraced by the courts
far more recently than the patent misuse doctrine, a number of recent
decisions have held that certain kinds of conduct exploiting the rights
conferred by a copyright-particularly when the copyright owner's
goal in undertaking that conduct is to limit or injure competition-will
also constitute misuse.111 This doctrine similarly grows out of the
principle of "unclean hands"-a court of equity will not lend its sup-
port to the owner of a copyright, even against a recognized infringer,
if the plaintiff's conduct is inequitable. 1 2 In what was probably the
first court of appeals decision expressly to recognize this doctrine, 113
in 1990 the Fourth Circuit held the unclean hands doctrine applicable
not only when the copyright owner attempted to use the copyright to
violate the antitrust laws, but also when the "copyright is being used in
a manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant of a
copyright. 11 4
111. See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Enter., Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 203-06 (3d
Cir. 2003); see id. at 206 ("[E]xtend[ing] the patent misuse doctrine to copyright, and
recogniz[ing] that it might operate beyond its traditional anti-competition context," but holding
it inapplicable to the plaintiff's behavior), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1178 (2004); A&M Records, Inc.
v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1026 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that "misuse defense prevents copy-
right holders from leveraging their limited monopoly to allow them control of areas outside the
monopoly"); id. at 1027 n.8 (observing "that a unilateral refusal to license a copyright may
constitute wrongful exclusionary conduct giving rise to a claim of misuse," but concluding that
plaintiff's conduct did not constitute misuse); Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d
772, 792-95 (5th Cir. 1999), discussed infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text; see also Prac-
tice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516, 520-21 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Conditioning
the license [of its code] on [licensee's] promise not to use competitors' products constituted a
misuse of the copyright," thus precluding its enforcement during period of misuse), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 933 (1997); DSC Commc'ns Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 601-02 (5th Cir.
1996) (concluding that district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that a copyright owner
did not have substantial likelihood of success on merits because its attempt to use its copyright
on software to extend that monopoly over unpatented microprocessor cards would constitute
copyright misuse); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 972-79 (4th Cir. 1990), dis-
cussed infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
See also Telecom Technical Servs. Inc. v. Rolm Co., 388 F.3d 820, 831 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding
it unnecessary to decide whether federal copyright law permits misuse defense); Data Gen.
Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1170 (1st Cir. 1994) (same). Cf Triad Sys.
Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1337 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that the defendant could not
successfully invoke copyright misuse doctrine where the defendant did not attempt to prohibit
the plaintiff from developing its own competitive software), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1145 (1996).
See generally Ramsey Hanna, Note, Misusing Antitrust: The Search for Functional Copyright
Misuse Standards, 46 STAN. L. REV. 401 (1994); Kathryn Judge, Note, Rethinking Copyright Mis-
use, 57 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2004); Note, Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense: The Role of
Antitrust Standards and First Amendment Values, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1289 (1991).
112. See Alcatel USA, 166 F.3d at 792.
113. Lasercomb Am., 911 F.2d at 972-79 (finding that it was misuse for copyright owner to
license its computer program on condition that licensees promise not to participate in the devel-
opment of similar, competing software).
114. The Fourth Circuit stated:
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Subsequent cases have found copyright misuse in a variety of other
situations where the plaintiff asserting copyright infringement was
found to have improperly sought to extend its copyright into other,
adjacent areas. For example in Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technolo-
gies, Inc.,1 5 the Fifth Circuit concluded that the restrictions imposed
by the plaintiff in its licenses of its copyrighted software to custom-
ers-that the software could only be used in connection with the
plaintiff's hardware-was in fact an indirect attempt to obtain patent-
like protection for its hardware through its software copyright. This,
the court held, constituted copyright misuse, which foreclosed an in-
fringement action, even if the defendant had unlawfully copied the
software to design its own competing products, and even if the defen-
dant's conduct might make its own hands unclean as well. 116
As is true with patent misuse, a finding of "copyright abuse" will
render the copyright unenforceable, notwithstanding what would oth-
erwise be infringing behavior. Therefore, here too, it follows that the
owner of a copyright who has engaged in such behavior should not
obtain shelter under the rights of the intellectual property regime.
Rather, if the other elements of an antitrust violation are present, then
that person or firm should have the same duty to sell its product to
others as would the owner of a product not protected by copyright.117
D. Improper Extension of Scope of Patent or Copyright
Even if the patent and copyright misuse doctrines are given a nar-
row application, the rule that improper attempts to extend the scope
of a copyright or patent may result in sanctions against the offending
party supports the condemnation under the antitrust laws of certain
So while it is true that the attempted use of a copyright to violate antitrust law probably
would give rise to a misuse of copyright defense, the converse is not necessarily true-a
misuse need not be a violation of antitrust law in order to comprise an equitable de-
fense to an infringement action. The question is not whether the copyright is being
used in a manner violative of antitrust law..., but whether the copyright is being used
in a manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright....
[T]he analysis necessary to a finding of misuse is similar to but separate from the analy-
sis necessary to a finding of antitrust violation.
Id. at 978-79.
See also Practice Management Information, 121 F.3d at 521 ("We agree with the Fourth Circuit
[in Lasercomb] that a defendant in a copyright infringement suit need not prove an antitrust
violation to prevail on a copyright misuse defense.").
115. Alcatel USA, Inc., 166 F.3d 772.
116. Id. at 792-95.
117. See generally Catherine Parrish, Note, Unilateral Refusals to License Software: Limita-
tions on the Right to Exclude and the Need for Compulsory Licensing, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 557
(2002) (criticizing the Federal Circuit's decision in Xerox and arguing that policy principles un-
derlying copyright law support limitations on the right to refuse to license works).
2006] 1241
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1211
refusals by the owners of this intellectual property to deal with their
competitors. This principle is best illustrated by the prohibition of
certain tying arrangements. It has been accepted law for nearly a cen-
tury that the manufacturer of a product covered by a patent may not
insist that its customers use only its unpatented staple supplies in con-
nection with the patented product11 or that they must also purchase a
second, unpatented product from it.119 Similar limitations exist on the
right of a copyright owner, prohibiting it from insisting that purchasers
or licensees take other products from it as a condition of obtaining the
tying product.120
Another basic principle is that although the patent or copyright
owner may fully exploit its invention or work, it is not permitted to
leverage or extend the market power from the federally created mo-
nopoly into another market where competition might otherwise pre-
vail. 121 Indeed, as the Supreme Court recognized in its Image
Technical decision, it "has held many times that power gained through
some natural and legal advantage such as a patent, copyright, or busi-
ness acumen can give rise to liability if 'a seller exploits his dominant
position in one market to expand his empire into the next.""122
118. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 n.13 (1984) (describing
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917), as "a case holding that the
sale of a patented film projector could not be conditioned on its use only with the patentee's
films, since this would have the effect of extending the scope of the patent monopoly").
119. See, e.g., Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (striking down an arrange-
ment in which the defendant conditioned the lease of patented machines for injection of salt on
the requirement that lessee purchase defendant's salt); Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States,
298 U.S. 131 (1936) (striking down an arrangement where IBM leased patented data processing
machines on the condition that only punch cards purchased from IBM be used in machines).
120. See United States v. Loew's, Inc, 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (striking down a motion picture
distributor's requirement that licensees of certain copyrighted films agree to take other, less-
desired films).
121. The Jefferson Parish Court stated:
Any effort to enlarge the scope of the patent monopoly by using the market power it
confers to restrain competition in the market for a second product will undermine com-
petition on the merits in that second market. Thus, the sale or lease of a patented item
on condition that the buyer make all his purchases of a separate tied product from the
patentee is unlawful.
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 16.
Accord Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see
supra note 52 for discussion of Atari. The Brulotte Court stated:
A patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate with the
leverage of that monopoly. But to use that leverage to project those royalty payments
beyond the life of the patent is analogous to an effort to enlarge the monopoly of the
patent by tieing [sic] the sale or use of the patented article to the purchase or use of
unpatented ones.
Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964).
122. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 480 n.29 (1992) (inter-
nal citations omitted). The Morton Salt Court stated:
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The rationale for the imposition of a duty to deal under these cir-
cumstances is not to create competition in the market that is the sub-
ject of the intellectual property protection, for that exclusivity is
indeed within the statutory monopoly conferred by the patent or cop-
yright statutes. 123 Rather, it is to allow competition in complementary
markets, which are not within the scope of the patent or copyright
monopoly. This outcome will reinforce the balancing of interests in-
herent in the existence of specified limits on the grants of power em-
bodied in intellectual property rights. And this outcome will also
advance the policies inherent in the antitrust laws. By barring the pat-
ent or copyright owner from exploiting adjacent but unprotected mar-
kets, the erection of barriers to entry will be reduced and vigorous
competition on the merits will be facilitated, resulting in an increase in
consumer welfare.
E. Mandatory Licensing as Sanctions
Finally, the courts have long recognized that mandatory licensing of
patents and sales of patented products are appropriate judicial reme-
dies after a patent owner has been found to have violated the antitrust
laws. For example, in United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd.,124 the dis-
trict court found that bulk-sales restrictions in the licensing agree-
ments between the defendant-patent owners and their licensees
constituted "per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act, ' 125 but then
declined to order the remedies sought by the government. Reversing
on direct appeal, the Supreme Court stated that "mandatory sales and
reasonable-royalty licensing... [were] well-established forms of relief
when necessary to an effective remedy, particularly where patents
But the public policy which includes inventions within the granted monopoly excludes
from it all that is not embraced in the invention. It equally forbids the use of the patent
to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the Patent Office and
which it is contrary to public policy to grant.
Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942).
123. Professors Lopatka and Page have noted:
A sufficient condition for illegality should be that the monopolist, through its conduct,
derives monopoly profits in a market, in which its intellectual property is not practiced,
that it could not have obtained by fully exploiting its monopoly power in markets in
which that property is practiced .... [I]f proven, acquiring monopoly profits in a sec-
ond antitrust market, in which the protected property is not used, whether through
tying or unilateral refusals to deal, is not included in a statutory grant of intellectual
property rights and should be open to antitrust analysis.
Lopatka & Page, supra note 28, at 397-98.
124. 410 U.S. 52 (1973).
125. Id. at 56.
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have provided the leverage for or have contributed to the antitrust
violation adjudicated. '126
Application of that standard-that mandatory sales or licensing are
appropriate when the patents were integral to the antitrust violation-
is arguably more problematic in at least one of the two cases under
discussion (Xerox), where the very issue was whether the patent or
copyright holder's refusal to sell violated the antitrust laws. The result
in Image Technical is certainly justified, where the Supreme Court had
held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a claim that the defen-
dant's practices constituted unlawful tying arrangements, and where
only a small number of the tied products were protected by patents.
And, as discussed above, even in the Xerox case, although the result is
admittedly less clear, a court could reasonably have found that the
defendant's attempt to use its patents and copyrights to extend the
monopoly into the market for repair services-which would have
been competitive but for its refusal to deal-was violative of § 2 of the
Sherman Act. 127
F. Trinko
A potential source of objection to the imposition of a duty on cer-
tain patent or copyright owners to deal with competitors or customers
is the Supreme Court's recent decision in Trinko.1 28 There, the Court
126. Id. at 59. "Mandatory selling on specified terms and compulsory patent licensing at rea-
sonable charges are recognized antitrust remedies." Id. at 64.
The Supreme Court has approved similar remedies, after finding that the defendants had vio-
lated antitrust laws, on a number of occasions. See, e.g., Besser Mfg. Co. v. United States, 343
U.S. 444, 447 (1952); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 93 (1950); Int'l Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392, 399-400 (1947); United States v. Nat'l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 338
(1947).
See also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 192-93 (D.D.C. 2002) (approv-
ing consent decree which contained, inter alia, provisions requiring Microsoft to grant licenses of
its intellectual property to specified entities on non-discriminatory basis upon payment of rea-
sonable royalties), affid in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 373 F.3d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004);
United States v. Spectra-Physics, Inc., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,290 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3,
1981) (approving a consent decree that resolved challenge to a merger containing provisions for
nonexclusive, royalty-free licenses of patents).
See generally Lawrence Schlam, Compulsory Royalty-Free Licensing as an Antitrust Remedy
for Patent Fraud: Law, Policy and the Patent-Antitrust Interface Revisited, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 467 (1998).
127. The Court's statement in Glaxo has close analogies to the gravamen of the ISOs' com-
plaint in Image Technical and Xerox. "[Ilt is clear from the evidence that the ... patent[s] gave
the [defendants] the economic leverage with which to insist upon and enforce the bulk-sales
restrictions imposed on the licensees." U.S. v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 60-61 (1973)
(internal citations omitted). Similarly, in Glaxo, the defendants' patents and copyrights created
economic leverage, enabling them to extend their monopoly position to the market for the ser-
vicing of their products.
128. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
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rejected a claim that an incumbent local exchange carrier had an obli-
gation to share its telephone network with competitors, distinguishing
its earlier decision in Aspen Skiing,129 which had found such an affirm-
ative duty. But there were a number of reasons given in Trinko for
refusing to impose this duty, including the absence of an earlier, vol-
untary business relationship between the defendant and its competi-
tors (as had existed in Aspen Skiing), and the presence of an extensive
regulatory framework dealing with the issues that the plaintiff sought
to have governed by the antitrust laws.
By contrast, not only is there no administrative or regulatory system
in place in situations like Image Technical and Xerox, but, as in Aspen
Skiing, the refusals to sell in these cases represented a change in prac-
tice, resulting in a reduction of consumer welfare. In Image Technical
and Xerox, the defendants had previously dealt either with the ISOs
directly or had sold the replacement parts to the customers, who had
then provided them to the ISOs in connection with the repair ser-
vice. 130 The prices for those sales had been set by the defendants at
presumably profit-maximizing levels. Therefore, like in Aspen Skiing,
the defendants' refusals to continue to sell could best be explained as
part of an attempt to limit competition and to extend monopoly power
into an adjacent market. 131 Thus, Trinko does not undermine the Su-
preme Court's earlier decisions that refusals to deal may form the
predicate of a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.132
Finally, one asserted objection to the imposition of a duty to deal,
alluded to in Trinko, is the administrative concern-the potential bur-
den that monitoring this objection might put on the courts.133 How
129. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
130. Cf PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 821-22 (6th Cir. 1997) (find-
ing that a manufacturer of industrial-control equipment that never sold its unpatented circuit
boards either to the plaintiff repair service company or to its customers did not engage in unlaw-
ful monopolization by its refusal to deal).
131. The Court stated:
The unilateral termination of a voluntary (and thus presumably profitable) course of
dealing suggested a willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticompeti-
tive end.... In Aspen Skiing, the defendant turned down a proposal to sell at its own
retail price, suggesting a calculation that its future monopoly retail price would be
higher.
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
132. A more complete analysis of the implications of Trinko-which has already been under-
taken in a number of thoughtful pieces-is beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Andrew
Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by Dominant Firms: Striking a Better Balance, 72 AN-
TITRUST L.J. 3 (2004); Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
147 (2005); John Thorne, A Categorical Rule Limiting Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Verizon v.
Trinko, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 289 (2005).
133. The Court noted: "We have been very cautious in recognizing such exceptions [to the
rule declining to impose a duty to deal], because of ... the difficulty of identifying and remedy-
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will a court evaluate the reasonableness of the terms on which the
defendant will deal with its competitors, including the prices it will
charge? While admittedly a real problem, this burden was substan-
tially lessened in cases such as Image Technical and Xerox. There the
defendants were already selling to third parties the replacement parts
that they refused to sell to the plaintiffs, including to some of the own-
ers of its equipment, at prices that were set by the defendants and that
presumably yielded an appropriate return to them. Courts could use
the existing contracts, entered into at arms length between the parties,
as a basis for overseeing any future contractual disputes.
VII. CONCLUSION
Both public policy considerations and the case law support the con-
clusion that the result reached by the Ninth Circuit in Image Techni-
cal-that under certain circumstances, firms that have improperly
exploited the monopoly power flowing from the ownership of intellec-
tual property, by extending that monopoly into other markets where
competition would otherwise have prevailed, should be required to
deal with competitors with respect to that property-is the soundest
harmonization of the federal intellectual property and antitrust re-
gimes. That reconciliation is certainly not inconsistent with the gen-
eral policies underlying the patent and copyright laws. Patent and
copyright owners would continue to be able to exploit fully the mo-
nopoly conferred by those grants, and they would be limited only in
attempts to extend that monopoly beyond the proper scope of the
grant. In this respect, patents and copyrights would be treated simi-
larly to other forms of property. And that result would best advance
the principal goal of the antitrust laws-and one that is hardly incon-
sistent with patent or copyright law-of increasing competition and
maximizing consumer welfare.
ing anticompetitive conduct by a single firm." Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408. "Effective remediation of
violations of regulatory sharing requirements will ordinarily require continuing supervision of a
highly detailed decree." Id. at 414-15.
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